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By EMORY H. NILEs*
Little Willie Jones had not washed his face; he had not
studied his lessons; and he spent most of his spare time in
reading the comics and looking at the television.
"Our Willie is a brat," said Mr. Jones to Mrs. Jones.
"That is correct," said Mrs. Jones.
In spite of this conversation they both loved Willie; they
knew he was good to his sister, and that he went regularly
to Sunday School.
When Mrs. Smith said to Mrs. Jones and Mr. Jones:
"Your Willie is a brat. He does not wash his face. He
does not study his lessons, and all he is interested in is read-
ing the comics and looking at television."
"Our Willie is not a brat," said Mrs. Jones. "Our Willie
is a very nice boy, and a whole lot nicer than your Johnny
Smith."
"I agree with my wife," said Mr. Jones, "and besides that,
what business is it of yours, meddling with our family
affairs?"
The moral of this story is that it all depends upon who is
talking. A member of the family is presumed to love the
child, and has a right to be critical. An outsider has not
such a right.
Today our Willie Jones is the procedural system of the
law of Maryland, and we are members of the family. If it is
clearly understood that we are members of the family, we
can call our Willie a brat, and believe that in some respects,
he is a brat, even though in general he is a good boy, and we
love him. It is in the spirit of a member of the family, there-
fore, that the subject of Pre-trial procedure is approached.
Our Willie, that is to say our procedure, is sometimes slow
in doing his duty; he often wastes time; he uses a jargon
that tends to obscure rather than to express the truth; he
t Delivered before the Maryland State Bar Association on January 26,
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Education.
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costs a lot of money; and in some respects certain people
have an interest in keeping his expenses high. However, if
we, his parents, foster parents and brothers, and in these
enlightened days I must add, his sisters, and his cousins,
and his aunts, can make Willie act a little more quickly, a
little more efficiently, and a little more satisfactorily to the
neighbors who, after all, are paying our Willie's bills, we will
be doing a good work, and cannot be fairly accused of either
neglecting, or not showing proper affection for, our Willie.
The purpose of this article is to explain a technique
which, although very recent in the history of our legal
system, has nevertheless caught the imagination both of
the Bench and the Bar throughout the United States, and
has, according to most reports, been found useful.
Some years ago the writer was chairman of a committee
of the Baltimore Bar Association to investigate and make
recommendations to that Association regarding the Inte-
grated Bar. Our committee worked and studied, and came
back with a neutral report, saying in effect that those who
had the Integrated Bar liked it; those who did not have the
Integrated Bar didn't want it; and, as far as we were con-
cerned, we were on the whole neutral. I am not quite so
neutral on the subject of Pre-trial, for I think it offers sub-
stantial possibilities of benefit to lawyers and their clients,
not to mention the public generally. Nevertheless, I do not
appear as an ardent proponent of any particular proposition.
Nor do I pretend to be an authority on this subject. This is
written simply for the purpose of outlining what has been
done in other places, what have been the objectives of Pre-
trial, what its proponents say for it, what difficulties I see in
connection with it, and what benefits might be anticipated if
it were given a trial in Maryland.
To repeat, I do not advocate any specific plan, and I may
as well anticipate my conclusion, to wit: that without any
legislation, without even a change in the Rules, without
anything but initiative on the part of a few judges and the
cooperation of the bar, Pre-trial is proving useful in Mary-
land, and its value should be further tested to a much wider
degree than has yet been attempted.
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Let us take a brief look at the history of procedure. It
has always had the same object, namely, the promotion of
justice between litigants. It has changed enormously in
the light of changes of social organization and of beliefs,
especially popular beliefs. When it was really believed that
a witch would sink, but an innocent man would float, the
ordeal by water was a rational procedure. When it was be-
lieved that the uttering of a false oath, after calling upon
the proper god, would result in that god's striking the per-
jurer blind or dead, the oath was a more potent adjunct to
finding the truth than it is believed to be today. When, as
in early Roman law, or in early English law, the utterance
of a prescribed formula, exactly and without a single mis-
take, was the prerequisite to commencing an action at law,
because it was believed that the words had a divine or magic
quality to evoke the truth, naturally no amendment was
granted, and the failure to utter the formula exactly was
considered proper and just ground for non-suiting the
litigant.
A great advance was made by the Common Law over
these systems of archaic procedure when. oral pleadings
seeking an issue of fact were devised in the Middle Ages;
and these were further improved when pleadings became
written, whereby in a series of reciprocal charges and
answers the common law worked out a method of arriving at
a definite, clear issue. But again the procedure was found
not perfect, and Equity, by the introduction of a new system
of pleading, by-passed the technicalities of the old "issue
pleading" of the Common Law through the more direct
"fact pleading" of Equity.
We are today in the period in which both the issue
pleading system of the Common Law and the fact pleading
system of Equity survive in part; but all will agree that
the formalism of the Common Law actions and the strict
rules of pleading are far less important than getting at
the truth. These systems aim to get at the truth, but in
many ways they were, and are, imperfect.
Let us come back to Willie. Little Willie grows up, and
even though we may correct the faults which he shows at
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the age of 8, 9 or 10, he develops others at 11, 12 and 13.
The clothes he wore at the age of 8 will not fit at the age
of 12. Society grows, times change, and the law changes
with them. Little Willie is not forever in the primary
school. He grows, too; and as he grows he needs new lessons
and new clothes.
Is it not the experience of the vast majority of the
members of the Bar that when a Judge, sensing a compli-
cated mixture of issues of fact and law, takes a recess from
formal court proceedings and asks counsel into chambers,
and thereupon undertakes to find out what the real issues
are, the progress of the case is often expedited? Does not
the direct, personal and informal contact of people inter-
ested in really getting down to business, result, in the vast
majority of cases, in their actually getting down to business;
admitting things that cannot be denied, waiving proof of
matters that are either immaterial, or well known, or not
in dispute? Agreement, either formal or informal, can be
obtained on many matters; and when cigarettes have been
extinguished and pipes knocked out, both the judge and
counsel return to the court, refreshed, and ready to try
the case on the real issues that it presents. There, in a
nutshell, is the whole idea of Pre-trial, except that instead
of wasting the time of jury, witnesses and public while
counsel and court are engaged in untangling the case in
chambers, all this could have been done two or three weeks
before by a sympathetic, patient and competent judge, with
diligent, competent and well-prepared counsel.
That is Pre-trial, and the rest of it is detail. Pre-trial is
not trial, for trial deals with disputed issues; Pre-trial deals
with issues that are either unnecessary or which cannot be
disputed. It is not Summary Judgment, for summary judg-
ment deals only with cases in which there is no dispute of
fact, i. e., cases which do not need trial at all. It is not
Discovery, for Discovery is the procedure designed to obtain
facts theretofore unknown.
Pre-trial is not a theory of law, a principle of justice,
or a matter involving constitutional rights. It is a gadget;
and like some gadgets it may be very useful, and like others
19501
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
it may cause more trouble than it is worth. Perhaps it
would be more dignified to refer to Pre-trial as a tool; and
it is a tool used, as its name implies, before the trial of a
case. In this respect it is in the same category as Discovery,
and of course in a much wider sense, Pleading. In theory it
contains nothing new. For centuries Common Law judges
have had and exercised the right to call counsel into con-
ference before a trial in order to discuss issues, settle
pleadings, agree on order of proof, stipulate as to undis-
puted facts, and, in rare cases, to discuss settlement.
However, the exercise of this power, cheerfully concurred
in by the Bar, has been limited generally to the more
complicated cases. The general run of cases has come up
in the good old fashioned way, with the judge knowing
nothing about them before they begin, and counsel playing
their cards close to their vests. Uncounted hours of prepa-
ration by counsel and of the time of participating witnesses
have been spent in getting ready to prove lots of things
which did not have to be proved, and lots of things that
could not be disputed. Judges seeing the files for the first
time as the trials began, have racked their overworked and
underpowered brains by glancing at a maze of pleading in
an attempt to discover what the case was really about. I
leave it to statisticians and sociologists to work out the
number of millions of man days which could have been
saved if, in every case, as a matter of routine, the judge
had been able to sit down with counsel, a week or so before
trial, and ask one or two simple questions, about the case.
If the judge and counsel on both sides are able to have
a half hour's conversation, it would frequently appear that
many facts are undisputed; that many documents are not
questioned; that the widths of streets, cycles of traffic lights,
ownership of motor vehicles, etc., are not questioned, and
can be agreed upon. Thereafter the whole time of the
attorneys in preparation and of the court at the trial can be
concentrated on the true issue of the case rather than on
useless preparation for unnecessary issues, and necessary
preparation against surprise issues. What, then, is the
difficulty? Obviously it is simply a mechanical or practical
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difficulty, namely, the difficulty implied by the phrase
"Trying the case twice," and inherent in any situation in
which a great many people have to be gotten together
without their wasting as much time in trying to prevent
wasting time as they would have wasted originally. That
the problem is not insoluble, is indicated by experience in
other States.
Many lawyers in Baltimore are familiar with the
embryonic efforts which I have made in jury trials after
opening statements have been made by counsel. My prac-
tice, which has steadily increased, has been, after opening
statements of counsel have been made to the jury, to dictate
in open court a Stipulation embodying the facts which both
counsel have already stated to the jury. This includes
identity of parties, ownership of motor vehicles, agency,
widths of streets, state of the weather, identity of books of
account, accuracy of photographs, genuineness of record
books, authenticity of documents, and many other matters
which are essential elements of any case, but which in the
case on trial are undisputed. It has saved a great amount
of time, and it has concentrated the attention of the jury
on the true issue. But it has never taken place until after
the trial has actually started; and thus all of the preparation
involved in proving essential but undisputed points has
been wasted.
Pre-trial is merely an extension of this practice in the
time dimension, whereby the agreement comes from a
week to two months ahead of the final trial preparation,
and makes a vast amount of that preparation unnecessary.
Pre-trial is a comparatively new device, but there has
been a large amount of periodical legal literature devoted
to it. It really did not start until 1929 when Judge Ira W.
Jayne, of Detroit, originated the system as a system, rather
than as an idiosyncrasy of an individual judge.
Since then the Law Reviews have had many articles on
the subject, and two books stand out as valuable sources
of information. The first is Chief Justice Arthur T. Vander-
bilt's "Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration",
published in 1949. Chapter 5 of that survey is devoted to
1950]
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Pre-trial conferences, and gives the present status of this
device in the United States. The only textbook devoted
solely to this subject which has come to my attention is
that of Mr. Harry D. Nims, of the New York Bar, entitled
"Pre-trial", and published in 1950. Mr. Nims has evidently
engaged in a vast correspondence with judges all over the
country, and has embodied in his book many of the personal
views, individual practices and local variations which have
been experimented with from Maine to California.
Perhaps more important than textbooks and law review
articles are the "live" demonstrations which have been put
on before Bar Association meetings by advocates of Pre-
trial procedure. Judge Bolitha J. Laws, of the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, and Judge
Jayne, are among the most active of these proponents. A
most interesting demonstration was given by Judge Laws
at the Seattle meeting of the American Bar Association in
1948, and again at the Washington meeting in 1950. Anyone
who has seen one of these demonstrations must, I think, be
convinced that unless the machinery to prepare and operate
Pre-trial procedure is too cumbersome, the Pre-trial con-
ference has great value. A similar demonstration might
well be considered for the future by the Maryland Com-
mittee on Continuing Legal Education.
The earliest reported case on the subject seems to have
arisen in Massachusetts in 1937. It is Fanciullo v. B. G. &
S. Theatre Corporation,1 and it refers to an order of one
of the judges in Boston (Suffolk County) dated June 20,
1935 as the origin of Pre-trial procedure in Massachusetts.
Since then something like 200 reported cases have now
appeared in the Reports. In them are found dicta indicating
further the objects of Pre-trial. For example, in Byers v.
Clark & Wilson Lumber Co.,2 the "elimination of surprise".
In La Canin v. Automobile Insurance Company,3 the court
stated that its object was to "avoid elaborate preparation
on non-existent issues".
'297 Mass. 44, 8 N. E. 2d 174 (1937).
27 F. Supp. 302 (D. C., D. Ore. 1939).
'41 F. Supp. 102 (D. C., E. D. N. Y. 1941).
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Judge Vanderbilt's statistics show that although Pre-
trial is so recent as a system, it is now accepted officially in
26 States either as a matter of practice, or by rule, or by
statute. In only 19 States is there no official recognition
of Pre-trial. Maryland is of course among the 19, and we
have some respectable company, including Virginia, New
York and California. But the black, or non Pre-trial, areas
on Judge Vanderbilt's map also coincide to a large extent
with the less enlightened areas of the United States, and
even in his shaded areas, large metropolitan communities
such as Boston, Detroit and New York City have established
Pre-trial in their courts. Surprisingly enough, California
adopted Pre-trial, and abandoned it after two or three years.
Perhaps this is one of the best arguments for our taking it
up. As is well known, the Federal Rules (Rule 16) provide
for Pre-trial throughout the Federal system, although it is
optional with each judge as to whether or how he should
use it.
In Maryland I know of no court rules requiring Pre-
trial or even sanctioning it, but I know also that in
Baltimore County, Judge Howard Murray and Judge John
Gontrum have used it extensively, and they at least say,
with good results. Whether other judges in Maryland have
tried it, I do not know. Whatever may be the future of
Pre-trial as practiced in Baltimore County, I have at least
not heard of any impeachment proceedings brought against
Judge Murray or Judge Gontrum as a result of their using it.
When the Federal Rules were adopted, a survey was
made of the uses of and experience with Pre-trial, and the
result was embodied in Rule 16 of the present Federal
Rules. While the Federal Rules thus approve Pre-trial,
the institution itself is essentially an outgrowth of State
practice, and I think it should not be condemned for the
sole reason that it is in the Federal Rules.
An examination of the various Rules covering Pre-trial
will soon disclose that its essential nature is embodied in
two basic elements, viz.: (1) The conference; (2) The Pre-
trial order, indicating the nature of the case, the area of
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agreement, and the area of disagreement. A necessary
adjunct is the efficient operation of a Pre-trial Docket.
One thing should be made clear at the outset, namely,
that Pre-trial procedure is as varied and as variable as
judicial personality and geographical diversity. There is
no uniformity whatever about it, and the way in which it is
handled has varied from State to State, from city to city,
and from judge to judge, to suit the exigencies of the
legal, local and judicial temperament. The only criterion
is to make it useful in the light of all the conditions
surrounding it.
In order to forestall some fears, I call attention to the
fact that most persons familiar with Pre-trial do not include
as an essential of Pre-trial the desire to promote settlements,
or to force settlements, or to bludgeon recalcitrant parties
into settlements, which the judge believes, but the parties
do not believe, ought to be made.
Since the matter is entirely informal, any modification
can be made without formality. It might even be proper to
say that the form of Pre-trial procedure can hardly be
changed, because it has no form. Each Pre-trial act auto-
matically takes a form appropriate to the case itself. But
with this qualification, we can see that the specific functions
of the Pre-trial conference deal with the following 6 specific
matters: (1) Simplification of the issues; (2) Necessity or
desirability of amending the Pleadings; (3) Obtaining
agreements on facts common to both parties, undisputed,
or indisputable; (4) Obtaining agreements as to exhibits,
whether as to authenticity of originals, or accuracy of
copies; (5) Limitation as to the number of expert witnesses;
(6) Advisability of preliminary reference to a Master for
findings. Of these the 3rd and 4th, namely, the undisputed
facts and documents, seem to me to overshadow in import-
ance all the others put together. In every case there are
facts which can be agreed on; in many cases there are
documents which cannot be disputed. Only in a minority
of cases is there a real necessity for simplification of issues,




As indicated by the demonstrations which I have seen,
a Pre-trial conference requires from 10 to 30 minutes in
the average case. Most cases, of course, are simple, and
the Pre-trial conference is correspondingly simple. Like
the Rules of Discovery, it cannot be operated by a judge
imposing his will upon unwilling counsel. Counsel must
co-operate; and again, like Discovery, counsel will probably
find that this innovation is not for the benefit of plaintiffs
or defendants, but for the benefit of both sides alike.
At the end of the Pre-trial conference, the judge pre-
pares an Order embodying the results of the conference,
and this order is the tangible product which comes out of
the conference. There is no set form for it, and no univer-
sally accepted way of preparing it. But after it has been
made and signed by counsel, it is the controlling document
in the case. To a large extent it supersedes the Pleadings,
for it says in simple and brief language what the Pleadings
say in language which I regret to say is often as obscure,
unintelligible and prolix as the lawyers can make it. When
the formal trial begins, not only the lawyers but the trial
judge can see at a glance exactly what the case is about,
and exactly what is the question in dispute.
It may seem, so far, that the picture that I have drawn
is so rosy that I cannot substantiate my claim to be an
unprejudiced observer, and that I am really a convinced
advocate of Pre-trial procedure. I will confess that I am an
advocate of trying it out, but there are many problems
connected with it on which I have not taken sides; and I
outline them in order that the Bench and Bar may have an
idea both of the wide variations in actual practice through-
out the country, and of the difficulties which may be
encountered.
The first basically unsettled question is whether the Pre-
trial Judge should be the same judge as the trial judge.
There are advocates of both systems. On the one hand, it is
contended that the Pre-trial conference loses half its value
if the Pre-trial judge merely makes up and hands on a short
memorandum to another judge; it is the Pre-trial judge who
has understood the atmosphere of the case and the conten-
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tions of the parties, and it is he who ought to try the case.
On the other hand, it is contended that if the Pre-trial judge
is also the trial judge, and particularly if there has been any
talk of settlement, he has already not only pre-tried, but
has also pre-judged the case; and the party against whom he
has conceived some prejudice will inevitably have thrown
away his chances of winning. There is no agreement on this
question, but there is great variety in practice. In 13 states
the judge who will hear the case presides at Pre-trial. In 4
states a different judge presides. In 9 states both systems
are used. In some states a single judge is specially assigned
to hear all Pre-trials. As far as I can tell, neither side has
proved its case, and all systems work with considerable
satisfaction to those who use them.
Another question, though hardly of so great importance,
is whether the Pre-trial conference should take place in the
courtroom or in chambers. Some judges prefer one, and
some the other. Neither side in this controversy seems to
criticize the other severely, but each advocates its own
system. Since a Pre-trial conference is held as a result of a
formal and compulsory summons, and is based upon a reg-
ular calendar or docket, I should be inclined to favor a con-
ference in open court. I think the controlling factor, how-
ever, would be the personalities of the judge and the
counsel. One by-product of having the case in open court
is, that the attorneys waiting for the next case would hear
the proceedings; but I can understand that there may be a
difference in opinion as to whether this is good or bad.
It is still unsettled as to whether parties should be
expected to be present at a Pre-trial conference. In some
jurisdictions the judges seem to welcome the presence of
the parties, feeling that if the client is not present he may
think that he has been double-crossed by more or less secret
proceedings held in his absence. In one State, Wisconsin,
the parties are required to be present in family cases. In
other jurisdictions the judges take the position that a Pre-
trial conference is of such an informal nature that it is
better to have it purely between court and counsel. My
own feeling would be that the normal Pre-trial conference
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should be held between the judge and counsel only, but
that if the clients want to attend they should be allowed to
do so.
There is no uniformity in the practice with respect to
the time at which the Pre-trial conference should be held.
In some jurisdictions it is held on the first day of the term,
i.e., immediately before trial. In some, e. g., Ohio, the re-
verse procedure is followed, and it is held as soon as issue
has been joined. The vice of the first system is that since
the lawyers must be ready for trial, they must have made
all the preparation which the Pre-trial system is designed
to avoid. The vice of the second alternative is that the
lawyers are often not ready, have not worked up the case,
and do not know sufficient facts to participate in an intelli-
gent Pre-trial conference so early in the course of the action.
The weight of opinion seems to be that the best time for the
Pre-trial conference is two or three weeks before the
anticipated date of trial. At this point counsel must be
fairly well informed on the facts, must know approxi-
mately what they will be able to prove, and also presumably
know enough to engage in intelligent negotiations for settle-
ment. There is no uniformity, and only experience will
tell what is the best time for the conference.
Should Pre-trial be used in jury cases only, in non-jury
cases only, or in all kinds of cases? Again there is no uni-
formity. The history of the matter indicates that Pre-trial
was started in connection with jury cases only, and has been
extended gradually to other cases. In at least one State,
Pre-trial is used only in connection with non-jury cases
and jury cases are excluded. In many jurisdictions divorce
and other domestic relations cases are excluded. There
seems to be neither unanimity nor sufficient experience
upon which to base a final opinion on the character of cases
in which Pre-trial can be usefully employed. Nor is there
uniformity on whether Pre-trial should apply to all cases
or only to selected cases within a given category.
Another question on which agreement has not yet been
reached is the extent to which Pre-trial should inquire into
1950]
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the cases of the respective litigants. Is there any duty of
disclosure by the attorney for the plaintiff of facts not
known to the attorney for the defendant? Is either
attorney entitled to inquire at the Pre-trial conference into
matters which would be the proper subject of Discovery, or
even into matters beyond the scope of the Discovery pro-
cedure? How far should Pre-trial take the place of Dis-
covery, whether in its old form of requests for bills of
particulars or in its modern form of depositions for Dis-
covery? Should, for example, the defendant be entitled in
a motor vehicle case to inquire as to exactly what specific
acts of negligence the plaintiff intends to prove; or may he
be allowed to fortify himself behind general allegations of
negligence? There is little law covering these points, but
the trend would seem to be in the same direction as that of
Discovery itself, namely, to widen the field of inquiry for
the purposes of eliminating surprise, and generally con-
fining the formal trial to issues known in advance by both
sides.'
Many practical problems have arisen with respect to
conducting Pre-trial conferences in rural areas. In one dis-
trict in Iowa, for example, the distance between county
seats at the limits of a judicial district is 350 miles, and
the time required to travel from one county seat to the
other by railroad is two days. Obviously, we have no such
problems of distance in Maryland, but we have similar
problems in less acute form; and since convenience and
efficiency is the very keynote of the Pre-trial procedure,
some means must be devised to obviate the necessity of
requiring lawyers to travel twice to the place at which the
judge sits, instead of once.
After the Pre-trial order has been drawn up and signed
by the judge and counsel for the parties, how far should
amendment be allowed? The very object of the Pre-trial
order is to obviate the necessity of unnecessary proof, and
to provide a base upon which firm reliance can be placed
by any lawyer in preparing the case. The order constitutes
' Nims, Pre-Trial (1950), 115 and Duffy v. Gross, 214 P. 2d 498 (Colo. 1950).
not only an agreement, but an agreement of some dignity,
which should not be disregarded except for weighty reasons.
Clearly, cases may arise in which it would be unjust to insist
upon the letter of the agreement where a mistake has been
made. My own practice with the embryonic stipulation
which I mentioned above,5 has been always to insert a
clause allowing any party to call attention to any error in
the stipulation, and to introduce evidence to correct such
error. This clause has allayed the fears of many lawyers
who would otherwise be unwilling to stipulate; but my
actual experience has been that although I have dictated
hundreds of such stipulations I remember no instance in
which one had to be modified. Perhaps the answer to the
question as to how far amendments should be allowed is
contained in the simple sense of justice which inspires a
provision in force in many states, namely, that when once
made, the Pre-trial order shall not be amended except "to
prevent manifest injustice".
Should the Pre-trial order be signed by the judge alone
or by the judge and counsel, and when and where should it
be prepared? Some judges prepare a Pre-trial order after
the conference, sign it and mail it to counsel. Some judges
prepare the Pre-trial order in the presence of counsel, but
do not require counsel to sign it. Other judges dictate the
Pre-trial order in the presence of counsel, sign it and then
require counsel to sign it. It seems to me that the procedure
of Judge Laws6 is the best, namely, as a part of the con-
ference itself, to dictate the Pre-trial order to a stenographer
who does not take it down in shorthand, but types it directly
from dictation. When this is done, counsel examine it, and
it is signed by both counsel and judge, before counsel leave
the conference room. This method seems to me to offer
the greatest chance of expedition, accuracy, and mutual
understanding.
How far should Pre-trial be compulsory? To those of
us who are used to the crowded dockets in Baltimore City,
and who know how high is the proportion of cases which
5 Supra, p. 305.
1 Supra, p. 306.
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never come to trial, it may seem that the institution of
compulsory Pre-trial in every case would entail a tremen-
dous waste of energy on the part of both the Bar and the
Bench. Is it possible to pre-try every case without twice
trying every case, and is it sensible, when everyone knows
that at least half the cases will not be tried anyway? The
Federal rules leave the matter of Pre-trial in every aspect
optional with the District judges. Again, the only answer
to this question must be furnished by experience.
I have saved the hottest controversy until the end. It
is the question of Settlements. On the one hand, certain
proponents of Pre-trial state that one of the major benefits
to be obtained from it is the fact that the judge who hears
the case at Pre-trial gets a fair idea of the merits and can
intervene effectively to promote and urge a just settlement.
Some Rules specifically state that one of the objects of
Pre-trial is to promote Settlements. On the other hand,
the exact opposite is contended for, namely, that Settlement
is the lawyers' business, and not the judges' business; that
some judges are more interested in settling cases than in do-
ing justice; and that in any event, if the judge takes a hand
in urging or even suggesting a settlement, he is stepping out
of his proper function, and to a certain extent disqualify-
ing himself for trying the case if it is not settled.
There seems to be no doubt that Pre-trial does in fact
result in increasing the number of Settlements, but there
is great doubt in my mind as to whether more cases are
settled because the judge tries to get them settled, than
because the simple elements and value of the case emerge
from the Pre-trial conference proceedings. The lawyers
are not fooled, and. each side is probably experienced in
evaluating its case, and in knowing what it is worth for
purposes of settlement.
Logically, a judge is stultifying himself in urging the
settlement of cases, for the judge's business is primarily
the trying of cases. Practically, of course, this is not true,
and the judge may be very helpful in promoting a settle-
ment where there are disputed facts, and where the out-
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come of the trial is subject to the uncertainties of the
reactions of the jury.
Every shade of opinion seems to be represented in this
controversy about how large a part the judge should take
in promoting settlements. Judge Jayne,' a very experienced
and careful judge, includes the promotion of Settlements
as one of the functions of the Pre-trial judge, but, he
emphasizes, only after everything else has been done.
Some judges take the position that although they should
not initiate negotiations for Settlement, neither should they
discourage such negotiations. These judges wait until one
of the parties suggests that he explore the possibilities of
settlement. I incline to the view that this is the proper
course for the judge to aim to follow, but even in such a
course there are pitfalls, for the lawyer with a weak case
might easily try to hide behind the judge's authority, and
perhaps use it to bolster up a flimsy contention which the
other side might otherwise easily be able to disprove at
the trial itself. Again we are in the field of personalties
and variations due to the circumstances of individual cases.
One fact does emerge, however, from the utterances of
all the contestants in this dispute, namely, that Pre-trial
does result in many settlements, and there seems to be far
more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with the way in which
this result takes place.
I can sum up what I have tried to say very simply. As
Mr. Nims points out, after his survey of the Pre-trial field,
lawyers have for years been free to confer with each other
on Settlements, but they have been chary of initiating
negotiations for fear that such action would be taken as a
sign of weakness. For years judges have had the power to
call conferences, but they have been too busy, particularly
in the larger cities, to do much more than try cases, and
they have also been prevented from doing so by the habit
and tradition of the profession, which confines the judges'
function to formal hearings, and shows considerable hos-
tility to their initiating, or even taking part in, any activity




the old-fashioned theory of the trial with no holds barred,
the trial of wits, the trial as a public entertainment at the
county seat, and the pleasure of watching a good fight.
In the comparatively short time which has elapsed
since wide use of Pre-trial has been in existence, Pre-trial
has been found to be beneficial to the courts; it has reduced
the time and effort necessary to try cases. It has been
beneficial to litigants whose costs have been lessened, and
whose time has been saved in presenting their cases. It has
been beneficial to witnesses, from whom the court often
gets the benefit of testimony without actually wasting time
in court. It has been beneficial to the Bar through increas-
ing its own efficiency by increasing the volume of business
transacted. It has also increased the confidence of the public
in the profession generally. There are many problems to
be solved, but they are problems of detail rather than
problems of principle.
For my own part, it seems to me that in Maryland two
things are needed: (1) Professional blessing by rule or
otherwise for an optional Pre-trial procedure; and (2) a
Pre-trial experiment on a substantial scale. Pre-trial is
simply the use of common sense in preparation for trial.
It does not take the place of the formal trial dealing with
disputed issues. It does not take the place of Discovery to
obtain new information. It does not take the place of
Summary Judgment, in disposing of cases where there are
no disputed issues. What it does do is to eliminate from
the trial itself the irrelevant, unnecessary, fictitious and
obstructive matter which now makes our formal trials some-
thing far less than models of efficiency. The testimony of
those whose views I have read indicates that Pre-trial
procedure is not only common sense, but that it will be
good for the pocketbooks as well as for the consciences of
both the Bar and the public. I hope that before the next
mid-winter meeting, someone will have gotten started on
a substantial experiment in Maryland from which the
Bench and Bar can draw their own conclusions.
And now back to Little Willie. Willie Maryland is not
the worst of the 48 boys in the class, but neither is he the
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best. Willie Maryland is not an angel; he has many good
qualities, but he also has some bad ones. In some respects
his manners and his actions could be improved by sympa-
thetic counsel and labor on the part of us, the members
of his family, including his sisters and his cousins and his
aunts.
